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Municipal Home Rule,
A Progress Report?
Arthur B. Winter --
I. THE HOME RULE CONCEPT
The concept of municipal home rule, a late nineteenth and
early twentieth century development, finds its origins in the Anglo-
American tradition of the "inherent right of local self-government."
In essence the tradition embodies the idea that the people of a
community, in order to enjoy most fully their responsibilities as
citizens, should be accorded the fullest possible authority over their
own municipal destinies.' At the same time it is understood that
such locally exercised authority will not encroach upon the jurisdic-
tion and prerogatives of Parliament or-in the United States-the
several states.
* A.B. 1947, Emory University; M.Sc. 1948, University of Denver; Ph.D.
1955, Duke University; presently Assistant Professor of Political Science,
University of Nebraska.
I Among the better judicial expressions extolling the policy of local
autonomy is that of Brown, J, dissenting in People ex rel. Wood v. Draper,
15 N.Y. 532, 562 (1857). The case involved the constitutionality of an act
by which the state legislature created a metropolitan police district en-
compassing the counties of New York, Kings, Westchester and Richmond.
Control of the force was placed in the hands of the state government
through its power to appoint the governing body of police commissioners.
The New York Court of Appeals found the act valid, but Brown, J, dis-
sented as follows:
... Wherever the Anglo-Saxon race have gone, wherever they
have carried their language and laws, these communities, each with
a local administration of its own selection, have gone with them. It
is here they have acquired the habits of subordination and obedi-
ence to the laws, of patient endurance, resolute purpose, and the
knowledge of civil government, which distinguish them from every
other people. Here have been the seats of modern civilization, the
nurseries of public spirit, and the centers of constitutional liberty.
They are the opposites of those systems which collect all power at a
common center, to be wielded by a common will, and to effect a
given purpose; which absorb all political authority, exercise all its
functions, distribute all its patronage, repress the public activity,
stifle the public voice, and crush out the public liberty.
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A. CAUSE AND EFFECT
In America the New England colonies most probably were the
seedbeds of the tradition of local autonomy.2 As the pioneers moved
westward, New England customs and traditions followed. This,
coupled with the individualism engendered by the frontier, further
nourished the basic desire for local autonomy. It was therefore to
be expected that institutional manifestations of such a feeling would
ultimately develop. So it is not surprising to note that home rule
provisions appeared first in constitutions of the western states.3
The simple desire for self-government, however, was not the
sole contributing factor in the development of municipal home rule.
It may be more true to say that the tradition of local autonomy was
simply a convenient rallying concept, rediscovered in the closing
years of the nineteenth century by those communities which were
beginning to suffer the adverse effects of centralized legislative and
judicial control over local affairs. In many cases the desideratum
was not strictly "local self-government" but rather an escape from
the corrupt practices of state legislatures. 4 As put by a leading
commentator on home rule, "the ... movement is part of the broader
movement to liberate cities from organized corruption, and restore
control to the so-called, or self-called good citizens."5 Abuses ran
in two major channels. First, local measures of no partisan sig-
nificance introduced by legislators from a given community (and
affecting only that community) were, as a matter of legislative
courtesy, allowed passage without debate and deliberation through
the legislative houses. It was, of course, understood that reciprocity
would rule for the passage of other local measures proposed and
introduced by other local legislative delegations. This system
placed communities completely at the mercy of the local legislative
delegation. Charters were amended, taxes were raised, municipal
officials were appointed and removed, grandiose construction pro-
jects were approved, and other steps were taken-all under the
sponsorship of the local legislative delegation. The second major
abuse was of a more quantitative nature. As populations within
cities increased with growing rapidity and technological advances
2 See Porter, County and Township Government in the United States
21-42 (1922).
3 The first home rule state was Missouri which in 1876 adopted a con-
stitutional provision granting St. Louis local self-governing powers. Cali-
fornia (1879), Washington (1889) and Minnesota (1896) followed.
4 McBain, The Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule 5-12 (1916).
5 McGoldrick, Law and Practice of Municipal Home Rule 1916-1930 3-4
(1933).
MUNICIPAL HOME RULE
appeared, the resulting demand for an expansion of municipal activ-
ities required more and more local legislation. This meant ulti-
mately that hundreds and hundreds of local acts had to be passed
during each legislative session. A state general assembly became in
fact city council for every municipality in the state. The natural
consequences of such a state of affairs were that state-wide munici-
pal business tended to impinge upon state business and more and
more local matters came to be treated more and more perfunctorily.
Moreover, underlying these legislative abuses and their attendant
bad results, was a broad growing tendency to shift the responsi-
bility for local government from the local communities to the state
capital.
Generally speaking, the courts aided and abetted the central-
ization of power. The classic expression of judicial opinion support-
ing the centralizing tendency is found in the words of Iowa Chief
Justice Dillon in the Cedar Rapids railway case: "Municipal cor-
porations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from, the [state] legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so
it may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control.",
(Emphasis added.)
A counterbalancing judicial view supporting the "inherent right
of self-government" is found in Judge Cooley's remarks in the
Michigan decision, People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut:7
The State may mould local institutions according to its views
of policy or expediency; but local government is a matter of
absolute right, and the State cannot take it away. It would be the
boldest mockery to speak of a city as possessing municipal liberty
where the State not only shaped its government, but at discretion
sent in its own agents to administer it; or to call that system one of
constitutional freedom under which it should be equally admissible
to allow the people full control in their local affairs, or no control
at all.
What I say here is with the utmost respect and deference to
the legislative department; even though the task I am called upon
6City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids and M.R.R.R. Co., 24 Ia. 455, 475
(1868). The case sets out the basic ideas of state-municipal relations which
have been formalized as Dillon's Rule. It has been restated as follows: "It
is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation
possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: . . . those
granted in express words; . . . those necessarily or fairly implied in or
incident to the powers expressly granted; ... those essential to the accom-
plishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not
simply convenient, but indispensable." Kneier and Fox, Readings in Muni-
cipal Government and Administration 40-41 (1953).
7 24 Mich. 44 (1871).
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to perform is to give reason why a blow aimed at the foundation
of our structure of liberty should be warded off. Nevertheless when
the State reaches out and draws to itself and appropriates the
powers which from time immemorial have been locally possessed
and exercised, and introduces into its legislation the centralizing
ideas of continental Europe, under which despotism, whether of
monarchy or commune, alone has flourished, we seem forced back
upon and compelled to take up and defend the plainest and most
primary axioms of free government, as if even in Anglican liberty,
which has been gained step by step, through extorted charters and
bills of rights, the punishment of kings and the overthrow of
dynasties, nothing was settled and nothing established.8
Despite these heroic words and congenial sentiments, the greater
part of the state and federal judiciary gave support to the legal
position in defense of centralization as held by Dillon.9
B. ADVANTAGES OF HOME RULE
It was because of the total effect of the legal, political and ad-
ministrative disadvantages of too closely held state control that
citizens turned to the constitutional remedy of the home rule amend-
ment to provide more responsible and efficient local government.
Specifically, the advantages sought were:
1. To prevent legislative interference in local affairs. This
would mean not only that ill-conceived, ill-considered and otherwise
undesirable local legislation need no longer emanate from the state
legislature, but it would also allow that body more time for con-
sideration of the broader problems of the commonwealth.
2. To permit local self-government. It has been said that local
government is the "keystone of democracy"-the rationale being
that responsible local self-government can serve as a school of gov-
ernment for the citizenry. With the elimination of state controls
over local affairs, decisions must be made by the affected citizens.
Thus, with home rule, authority for local government is made com-
mensurate with responsibility. A further advantage lies in the fact
that people "on the spot" are likely to know most about their own
problems; so that it logically follows that their solutions to such
problems are much more likely to be the correct ones-more likely
than would be the case if the problems had to be referred to a legis-
lative body hundreds of miles away.
3. To give cities adequate powers. Under the old system munic-
. Id. at 108.
9 Only the courts of Indiana, California, Kentucky, Iowa, Nebraska and
Texas have (at one time or another) adhered to Cooley's position. The
broad language of Dillon received the blessings of the United States Su-
preme Court in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
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ipal problems arising from greater urbanization and technological
advancement were frequently deferred until the biennial meeting
of the state general assembly. Under home rule provisions, charter
amendments can be made with as great celerity as the local situation
demands. Furthermore, home rule allows for innovation. A state
legislature would be unlikely to authorize, for example, the estab-
lishment of a municipal gasoline station. While, at the same time,
it might be felt within a specific municipality that such a facility
would be highly desirable.
Naturally, these are but potential advantages. Without popular
support they cannot be achieved. Home rule, like the short ballot
and the initiative, the referendum and the recall, has failed to
achieve its highly touted goals-where it has failed-simply because
the citizens adopted it as a panacea. It is also true that ignorance of
the advantages of constitutional home rule has deterred citizens in
many communities from seeking its adoption. From reports gath-
ered the writer concludes that the latter situation is the prevailing
one in Nebraska.'0
To date twenty-three states in the United States (including
Nebraska) have adopted constitutional home rule. It is to be hoped
that a growing interest and knowledge of municipal affairs will
inspire citizens to launch further municipal home rule ventures.
C. NEBRASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Nebraska's constitution provides two major safeguards against
state legislative interference with local affairs: (1) a "self-execut-
ing"" charter adoption procedure and (2) a ban on specific types
of legislation which otherwise would permit the state to interfere
with inherently municipal matters.
The self-executing home rule charter adoption procedure con-
sists of a series of prescribed steps which can be undertaken inde-
pendently by municipalities without recourse to permissive legis-
lative action. In cities of the first, primary, and metropolitan
10 See Shumate, Local Government in Nebraska, 5 Neb. Legis. Council
Rep. 36 (1939): "It is significant that these three cities [Omaha, Lincoln and
Grand Island-Nebraska's only home rule cities] are the largest in the state.
Thus, it would appear that the smaller municipalities are satisfied with
their old charters, or just indifferent in the matter."
And, Senning, Nebraska's Three Home Rule Charters, 21 Nat'l Munic.
Rev. 564, 568 (1932): "The future success of home rule in Nebraska seems
to depend upon the growth of an urban consciousness."
11 Salsbury v. City of Lincoln, 117 Neb. 465, 220 N.W. 827 (1929).
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classes, 12 the constitution permits qualified voters at a special or
general election to choose fifteen freeholders (who have been quali-
fied Nebraska electors for five years) to hold a home rule charter
convention. Within four months of election, the convention dele-
gates must meet, draft and adopt by majority vote a proposed
charter document. The draft is then submitted to the city clerk
who must publish it in the official or local newspaper three times.
Such publication must precede by not more than thirty days a
special or general election at which time the qualified voters by
majority vote may approve or disapprove the draft charter. If
approved, the new home rule charter takes effect after the passage
of sixty days.' 3 If rejected, the mayor and council have constitu-
tional permission to reinstitute after six months the complete pro-
cess of selection of delegates, convention and popular ratification of
a draft charter.14 There is also a constitutional provision allowing
a subsequent charter convention to be held for revising or abolish-
ing the home rule charter.'5 Still another provision authorizes either
the city council or a specified number of qualified electors to pro-
pose charter amendments. Such proposal must then be ratified
by a majority vote of the electorate. 16
In addition to the protection afforded municipal autonomy by
the home rule provisions, the state constitution has provided further
insulation from legislative interference by expressly denying the
legislature the power to enact local or special laws.'7 Authorities
in the field of municipal government agree that such a two-pronged
defense is necessary for the preservation of maximum autonomy for
home rule cities. Specifically, the state legislature is prohibited from
passing local legislation for the purposes of:
1. Changing the names of places;
2. Laying out, opening, altering and working roads;
3. Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys, and public
grounds;
12 Nebraska municipalities are classified as follows: Villages-population
below 1,000; second-class cities-1,000 to 5,000; first-class cities-5,000 to
40,000; primary cities-40,000 to 150,000; metropolitan cities-more than
150,000.
13 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 2.
14 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 3.
15 Ibid.
16 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4.
17 See Note, 29 Neb. L. Rev. 139 (1949).
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4. Incorporating cities, towns and villages, or changing or
amending the charter of any town, city or village;
5. Providing for election of officers in townships, incorporated
towns or cities;
6. Providing for the bonding of cities, towns, precincts, school
districts or other municipalities.' 8
The general effect of the prohibitions listed has been to elim-
inate annually the passage of hundreds of special, local and private
acts which have long been the curse of many other state govern-
ments. 19 Without a constitutional barrier such as this, Nebraska
would likely witness each biennium the passage of hundreds of pri-
vate acts dealing with insignificant local matters. Let it be empha-
sized again 2° that failure to ban local legislation is an open invita-
tion to the state legislature to constitute itself as county commission,
city council and school board for every governmental subdivision
within the state. As will be noted below, there have been some
tenuous judicial interpretations of these constitutional prohibitions
with respect to public acts of local application affecting Lincoln
and Omaha; but an analysis of state legislation since 1912 reveals
that at maximum only twelve such acts per biennium have been
in fact passed.
D. THE APPLICATION OF HoME RULE
Nothing in the history of Nebraska's home rule movement
seems in any way to have been done without caution and due delib-
eration.21 Five years elapsed before the 1912 provisions for home
rule were used by any city in the state. Lincoln, in 1917, was the
first to act. In that year she adopted her statutory charter as a home
rule charter. It is reported by a number of municipal officials from
first-class cities that more adoptions have not been made because:
(1) citizens seem to be content with the statutory charter provided
1s Neb. Const. art. III, § 18.
19 For example, Alabama, Arkansas, Maine, Michigan, Tennessee, and
Texas have in the past, or are still plagued by the private act system.
20 See note 4 supra.
21 As noted above, each of the three Nebraska home rule cities adopted
its statutory charter as its first home rule charter. It was not until late 1956
when Omaha adopted a new charter that any broad changes in municipal
government were wrought through the home rule process. Lincoln is to
consider substantial changes in its form of city government when sweep-
ing revisions of its home rule charter go before the electorate in the spring
of 1957.
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for all cities in the class; and (2) many people are completely un-
informed about home rule and its possibilities. 22
One factor which has worked to reduce the effectiveness of
municipal home rule is the peculiar application by the Nebraska
Legislature of a classification system which fixes Lincoln as the
state's only primary city, and Omaha as the only metropolitan city.
Thus, under the facade of a rational classification system, the legis-
lature passes acts (many of which have been subsequently blessed
by the state's judiciary) which apply as private or local legislation.23
The single-city classification was held not to clash with the state
constitutional prohibition against special legislation in 1884,24 but
Chief Justice Cobb envisaged a growth of other cities into the class
rather than a growth of classes with the city:
... I am unable to see any objection to the act under con-
sideration, which by its terms applies to all "cities of the second
class having more than ten thousand inhabitants," which does not
equally apply to the organic law or charter of all the cities in the
state. There may not be more than one city [Lincoln] now in the
state to which its provisions apply; but should our population con-
tinue to increase in the future as in the past it is reasonably safe to
predict that before the end of the present decade there will be
twenty. If an act is to be deemed inimical to the provisions of the
constitution above referred to [now art. III, § 18] simply because
in point of fact its operation is confined to one city, then it would
follow that our only city of the first class [Omaha] is utterly with-
out legal corporate existence, a state of things which could not have
been intended by the framers of the constitution. 25 (Emphasis
added.)
What Chief Justice Cobb had in mind in the Graham case
seemed eminently rational; and, in part, as he predicted other cities
gained sufficiently in population to enter what was then designated
as second-class city status. But each time Lincoln or Omaha has
been threatened with the possibility of sharing its classification with
another municipality, the legislature has adjusted the classifica-
tion, keeping the state's two largest cities isolated in separated
classes. The last readjustment came as recently as 1947 when the
unicameral legislature raised the lower population limit of metro-
politan cities to 150,000. Lincoln's unofficial population had reached
22 Eligible home rule cities are: Alliance, Beatrice, Columbus, Fairbury,
Falls City, Fremont, Hastings, Kearney, McCook, Nebraska City, Norfolk,
North Platte, Scottsbluff and York.
23 Note 17 supra. See State ex rel. Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W.
470 (1884); State ex rel. Wheeler v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N.W. 941 (1897).
24 State ex rel. Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W. 470 (1884).
25 Id. at 77, 19 N. W. at 471.
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the 100,000 mark which was then the dividing figure between metro-
politan and primary cities. Omaha would then have had to share
its metropolitan status with Lincoln.26
Because of the complexity of men's motives, it would be overly
dogmatic to assert flatly the real reasons why the legislative dele-
gations responsible for these changes did in fact effectuate them.
Three plausible motives for such a move might be these: (1) Un-
doubtedly the rivalry between the state's two largest cities-an
intangible thing to be sure-impelled the citizenry of each to sup-
port the status quo; inclusion of Lincoln in the same municipal
category with Omaha would likely have been as unsatisfactory to
the former as it would have been an affront to the civic amour
propre of the latter. (2) As long as the courts allow public acts to
apply to a municipal classification including only a single city within
that classification, the legislative delegation from such a city wields
a high power potiential. To include Lincoln and Omaha in the same
classification would mean a substantial reduction in power for the
legislative delegations of each. The legislators involved therefore
had a vested interest in maintaining things as they were. (3) Class-
ification of Lincoln as a metropolitan city might have required
alterations of laws and ordinances in conformity with "public acts"
affecting that class.
Thus, though local legislation is constitutionally prohibited,
through custom and usage, public acts of local application to Lin-
coln and Omaha are almost unquestionably acceptable both to the
courts and the principal legislative authority of the state.
In contrast to the state's two largest cities, Grand Island as the
third home rule city enjoys considerably more independence from
legislative control because she is one of fifteen first-class cities and
could not by any reasonable means be slipped into a special legis-
lative category. Thus, the delegation from the Grand Island area
can in no way "tailor" measures for application to Grand Island
only. The delegation is therefore prevented from exercising the
same type of control over its home town as can be exercised by the
groups from Lincoln and Omaha. Certain it is that Grand Island is
affected by all statutes pertaining to first-class cities generally.
But since so many cities are involved, conflicting pressures from
such municipalities and from other interests affected assure greater
consideration of any pertinent legislation. Under these circum-
stances, ill-favored measures are much less likely to control the
destinies of first class in contrast to the primary and metropolitan
cities.
26 See Breckenridge, The Mockery of Classification, 36 Nat1 Munic. Rev.
571 (1947).
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E. HoME RULE AND THE COURTS-GENERALLY
Five years elapsed before the people of Lincoln were to know
something of the judicial attitude towards the new home rule
charter. The first presentation of a matter concerning the charter
arose in Schroeder v. Zehrung27 over a question not precisely pe-
culiar to the home rule aspect of Lincoln's city government. A
glimpse of the court's liberal attitude towards home rule is seen
in the following:
... While a home rule charter adopted pursuant to the con-
stitutional provisions may not contravene any provisions of the
Constitution or of any general statute enacted by the legislature,
it is, in all other respects, binding and controlling. A city may enact
and put into its charter any provision for its government that it
deems proper, so long as they do not run contrary to the Consti-
tution or any general statute.28
In the same year as the Schroeder case was decided, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court touched on another feature of Lincoln's
charter, holding that that document ". . . falls within that class of
'Constitutions' which are to be construed as grants rather than
limitations of power; [and] that the principles of construction ap-
plicable thereto are the same as to a grant by the legislature...-29
This rule was explained more fully by the court in Standard Oil Co.
v. Lincoln by Mr. Justice Dean: The difference, he said, between
charters based on a grant of powers and those based on the other
hand upon a limitation of powers is that ". . . in the former case
all powers not expressly or impliedly granted to the city govern-
ment are reserved to the people; in the latter all powers are granted
27 108 Neb. 573, 188 N.W. 237 (1922). The case involved no attack upon
the home rule charter. Essentially, the plaintiff desired to compel the
city to refer for popular approval a council resolution "making ... a con-
tract to collect information and data necessary to the preparation of an
ordinance . . . " for zoning purposes. The court held that the resolution
was not a proper subject for referendum as it was administrative not
legislative in character. The court noted that general statutory provisions
conoerning municipal referenda did not apply to home rule cities.
28 Id. at 576, 188 N.W. at 238.
29 Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 69, 189 N.W. 643,
650 (1922). By ordinance, the City of Lincoln provided for the organization
and operation of a municipal fuel yard to sell wood and coal. At the time
there existed a statute (Neb. Laws c. 87, § 4 (1917)) permitting metro-
politan cities to engage in the coal business. Lincoln invoked the statute
to justify the ordinance. But the court ruled that since the charter had not
been amended to permit the activity, the ordinance was invalid. In dictum,
however, the court admitted that the operation of a municipal coal yard
was not beyond the constitutional powers of a city. Lincoln, at that time,
was classed as a metropolitan city.
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to thq city government except those expressly or impliedly with-
held."30 What he was attempting to compare was the power exer-
cised by the state general assembly with the power of the city
council. The council may do only those things specifically granted
in the charter. The legislature, on the other hand, is granted by the
constitution plenary power to legislate-except where specific pro-
hibitions exist. That the city (by charter) may authorize much is
not denied; but the council of its own volition may not act without
specific authorization. At this point, however, the court mistakenly
invoked Dillon's Rule38 in support of its argument. It held "that a
municipal corporation possesses and can exercise these powers only:
(1) those granted in express terms; (2) those necessarily or fairly
implied in, or incidental to, the powers expressly granted; and
(3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the
municipality, not merely convenient, but indispensible. ' '32 It would
have been quite appropriate for the court to use this rule in the
orthodox state-municipal situation-in the absence of a home rule
amendment. It was incorrect, however, to use it when comparing
the plenary legislative powers of the state general assembly with
the delegated authority of a municipal legislative body in a home
rule state. Perhaps it was an unconsciously given signal of coming
judicial pronouncements.
The question of what sort of act, function or charter provision
concerns public, general or state matters in contrast to an act or
function which concerns local or municipal matters, is of para-
mount importance to those interested in ascertaining the limits of
municipal autonomy in home rule cities. In Consumers Coal Co. v.
Lincoln,33 District Judge Ridick sketched broadly the general out-
30 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 252, 207 N.W. 172,
176 (1926). As amended by referendum, sec. 136 of the Lincoln charter
made provision for establishment by the city of a municipal gasoline sta-
tion. An implementing ordinance was passed and the city began to oper-
ate a filling station. The Standard Oil Company filed suit to close down
the city's facility alleging that there was no "'agreement, trust or com-
bination' among dealers in Lincoln or elsewhere, in the gasoline and oil
business . . . " that competition was active, and that there was no shortage
of supply. In addition the company alleged that the city's operation was in
violation of the due process clause of the 14th amendment. The court held
that the city "in carrying on the gasoline and oil business .... does no
violence to the Fourteenth amendment nor to any provision of the Ne-
braska constitution."
31 See note 6 supra.
32 Consumers Coal Company v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 69, 189 N.W.
643, 650 (1922).
33 Ibid.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lines which legislation by both the city and state should take.
Developing the court's position, he said:
We hold that the city may by its charter under the Constitution
provide for the exercise by the council of every power connected
with the proper and efficient government of the municipality, in-
cluding those powers so connected, which might lawfully be dele-
gated to it by the legislature, without waiting for such delegation.
It may provide for the exercise of power on subjects, connected
with municipal concerns, which are also proper for state legislation,
but upon which the state has not spoken, until it speaks.34
Although these words seem to support the concept of broad
municipal autonomy, the reader will note that Judge Ridick's
position here is not consistent with the position he assumed to
defend with the questionable help of Dillon's Rule some ten pages
later in the same decision. It also should be noted that the Judge
was careful not to spell out the specific meaning of municipal
powers as distinguished from state powers.
It it not easy in all cases to distinguish between municipal and
state powers, and when they come within the classification of police
powers, they are as impossible of accurate definition as the police
power itself, which Judge Cooley, in his work on Constitutional
Limitations, characterized as (I quote here from memory) "That
bastard power to which is referred for justification every infraction
of the liberties of the people." We must therefore content ourselves
with the consideration of each case as it arises, apply those prin-
ciples which precedent and logic approve.35
Since precedent functioning through the doctrine of stare de-
cLsis utilizes the views of jurists of yesterday, it is not surprising
to find that principles of state-city relationships existing prior to
home rule frequently have been employed by the courts-thus con-
tributing to the over-all weakening of this concept designed to
achieve greater local autonomy. Vestiges of this attitude may
be seen in Nagle v. City of Grand Island,3 where the court said:
" . . 'Where the legislature has enacted a law affecting municipal
affairs, but which is also of state concern, the law takes precedence
over any municipal action taken under the home rule charter'. '37
(Emphasis added.) In the same opinion the court noted that the
city's power was supreme only in matters of "strictly municipal
concern." In only one opinion has an indication been found as to
what functional areas would be properly considered as "matters
34 Id. at 58, 189 N.W. at 646.
35 Ibid.
36 144 Neb. 67. 12 N.W.2d 540 (1943). This decision involved a conflict of
state versus home rule charter provisions for eminent domain proceedings.
37 Id. at 69, 12 N.W.2d at 541.
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of state concern." 38 At no point in any of the opinions examined
were there expounded criteria for "matters of municipal concern"
or "matters of strictly municipal concern."
Briefly, then, on the basis of the rules in the cases examined,
the following general principles governing home rule generally
may be set out:
1. Home rule charters in Nebraska must conform to the federal
and state constitutions.
2. Home rule charters are to be construed as grants of power
from the state to the municipalities.
3. In matters of general, of state-wide concern, or municipal
concern (in the broad sense), state legislation takes prece-
dence over home rule charter provisions.
4. In matters of strictly municipal or local concern home rule
charter provisions take precedence over state legislation.
5. What is of general, of state-wide concern, of municipal con-
cern (in the broad sense), or of strictly municipal or local
concern will be decided as each case arises; and these are
matters for the courts to decide.
As will be more evident at the conclusion of this paper, these
principles governing the application of home rule to Nebraska cities
are in the main somewhat less than satisfactory. Aside from the
obvious necessity of requiring conformity with state and federal
constitutional law, and the not unreasonable rule which requires
a specific charter authorization before city council action involving
a new municipal function may be undertaken, the principles cited
above constitute no true guide as to what may legitimately be
accomplished by home rule cities. Depending upon the social, eco-
nomic and political inclinations of a court, almost any function ex-
cept for those traditional corporate or business types of functions
such as water, gas and electric service, may parade or masquerade
as matters of state interest. Having made up its mind to designate
some municipal activity as "a matter of state concern," the court
need only show, for example, that the activity can be subsumed
under the police powers, or that the function directly or indirectly
affects interests which lie beyond the corporate limits of the home
rule city. A municipal park might be a matter of state interest
because the state protects the general welfare-or the public morals.
Rules governing parking meters might be a matter of state interest
because motorists from all parts of the state may be forced to use
them. And a myriad of supporting opinions can easily be found
38 Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
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from non-home rule jurisdictions to justify the court's stand. Then
finally, the court always can take refuge in Dillon's Rule. To
escape from this present unsatisfactory state of affairs which seems
bound to continue until home rule becomes completely meaning-
less, there seems to be no obvious or clear-cut solution. The judici-
ary could easily effectuate the ideas behind the home rule amend-
ment, but the propensity so far is to move in the opposite direction,
towards greater state control. Probably the only lasting solution
would be found in the passage of amendments to the home rule
amendment designating specifically what constitute (1) matters of
state concern, (2) matters of municipal concern, and (3) matters
of strictly municipal concern. If such a step were to be taken, it
would only be proper to observe that there would be the possibility
of making the law too rigid. There is of course the possibility of
accomplishing a rational and lasting classification by legislative act.
It remains necessary now only to examine specific cases arising
from disputes involving home rule cities in order to show more
precisely how the general principles enunciated apply to the func-
tions of government undertaken by Grand Island, Lincoln and
Omaha.
II. SELECTED ASPECTS OF THE MUNICIPAL
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A home rule city in Nebraska in the ordinary course of its
day-to-day operation, for the most part, conducts its services, per-
forms its functions, and administers its laws in the same way as
those municipalities operating under the statutes governing cities
generally. Exceptional situations develop in those fields of activity
where home rule cities, by virtue of their allegedly autonomous
position, have taken the initiative and amended their charters,
ostensibly either to deal more effectively with some peculiarly
local problem or to undertake additional activities not prescribed in
the general statutes. Another area in which home rule cities differ
from other municipalities grows from the self-executing provisions
of the state constitution, specifically those governing the establish-
ment and amendment of home rule charters. It is to these latter
items that attention should now be turned.
As it adopts or amends a home rule charter, the city acts under
a constitutional power in a fashion similar to the state legislature
as it alters or amends provisions relating to cities generally. "The
people of a city in the adoption or amendment of a home rule
charter act legislatively. '3 9 Thus it has been said that a "charter
30 Noble v. City of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 87, 43 N.W.2d 578, 584 (1950).
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provision in the home rule charter has the same force and effect
as a statute. °40 In reviewing the procedural aspects of adoption and
amendment of home rule charters, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
been lenient. Probably Mr. Justice Dean had such procedural mat-
ters in mind when he wrote: "The trend of judicial pronouncements
appears to sanction an enlargement of the powers of the municipal-
ity . . .within constitutional limits, rather than a curtailment of
such powers."'1 The case then before the court involved a charter
amendment which was challenged because it had been published
three times at odd dates rather than the constitutionally prescribed
"three times, a week apart .. ",42 The court adopted the position
that "Those omissions and errors which work no wrong to substan-
tial rights are to be disregarded.'4 3
Once authority is granted by the voters of a home rule city, the
detailed execution of such authority is apt to be found an improper
subject of the voter's legislative function. For example, Lincoln,
within her home rule charter, was empowered to enact zoning
ordinances. Preparatory to the enactment of such an ordinance the
city council appropriated money to hire zoning experts. The reso-
lution (ordinance) was then referred to the people under the refer-
endum provisions of the charter. This latter action was voided by
the supreme court which held that the resolution was administrative
in character and did "not attain to the dignity of a legislative act.144
In a more recent decision again resting on the distinction between
legislative and administrative action, the court said:
To permit a referendum on each of the various steps in carry-
ing out a definite mandate of the voters to secure a site and build
a city auditorium would delay executive conduct of the council
and defeat the prompt and successful completion of the city auditor-
ium as directed by vote of the people .... We hold that it was an
act of legislation to direct and authorize the construction of a public
building, to fix the cost, and provide bonds to pay for it, but it is
an executive and administrative duty to select the site, buy same,
select plans and let a contract .... No one of the many executive
and administrative acts necessary to complete such project is refer-
able to a vote of the people as a legislative act.45
40 Bruett v. City of Omaha, 122 Neb. 779, 781, 241 N.W. 561, 562 (1932);
cf. State ex rel. Herbert v. Anderson, 122 Neb. 738, 743, 241 N.W. 545, 547
(1932).
41 Sandell v. City of Omaha, 115 Neb. 861, 868, 215 N.W. 135, 137 (1927).
42 Id. at 863, 215 N.W. at 135; Neb. Const. art. XI, § 3-5.
43 Id. at 865, 215 N.W. at 136.
44 Schroeder v. Zehrung, 108 Neb. 573, 577, 188 N.W. 237, 239 (1922)
45 State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, 149 Neb. 847, 858, 32 N.W.2d 918,
923 (1948).
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Judicial action taken to prevent submission of charter amend-
ments for approval of the electorate also arose in conjunction with
the construction of Lincoln's city auditorium. Authorization to
build, issuance of bonds, and choice of location had been passed
at various municipal elections in 1939, 1941 and 1949. A further
charter amendment bearing on the question of location was pro-
posed and a taxpayer's suit was filed praying the court to enjoin
the proceedings. Stating that "... courts will not, before the passage
of legislation, enjoin it or consider its validity or constitutionality
... [or] ... inquire into the legality or constitutionality of an elec-
tion before it is held... ," the supreme court held it would enjoin
the proceedings when failure to do so ".... would be followed by
some irreparable loss or injury beyond the power of redress by
subsequent judicial proceedings. '47 The opinion of the court also
included the assertion that ". . . where by amendment to a home
rule charter bonds for a project have been voted and directions
given to the city council to acquire a site [etc.] . . . an election
thereafter, the purpose of which is to select a site the effect of which
would be to defeat the prompt . . . completion of the project as
directed by the previous vote of the people, may be enjoined...,,48
Although Mr. Justice Yeager wrote the opinion of the court in the
first of the Noble cases,49 he dissented in the subsequent one. "I
think," said he, ".... it is in essence a long step toward destruction
of the constitutional division of the powers of government [for the
courts to enjoin consideration of a charter amendment]. To my
mind it is an unwarranted invasion of the legislative by the ju-
dicial department."50 Proponents of the maximum of local auton-
omy for home rule cities would undoubtedly agree.
A. THE EXERCISE OF CERTAIN QUASI-SOVEREIGN POWERS
".... [T]he preservation of order, the enforcement of the law,
the protection of life and property and the suppression of crime
are matters of state-wide concern . . ."51 This is probably as com-
prehensive a statement of the meaning of the phrase "matters of
state-wide concern" as can be found in any of the court's opinions
governing the affairs of home rule cities. As the court said in the
Consumers Coal case, it reserves the right to distinguish between
46 Noble v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457,459, 63 N.W.2d 475, 478 (1954).
47 Noble v. City of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 88, 43 N.W.2d 578, 584 (1950).
48 Id. at 89, 43 N.W.2d at 585.
40 Note 47 supra.
50 Noble v. City of Lincoln, 158 Neb. 457, 475, 63 N.W.2d 475, 486 (1954).
51 Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 60, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (1942).
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state matters, municipal matters, and matters of "strictly municipal
concern.152 In this and the subsequent sections of this paper almost
every case deals with a conflict of authority between a state law
of general application and a home rule city charter provision or
ordinance passed in pursuance thereof. It would, at first, be thought
that the orthodox distinctions of public as against private or pro-
prietary functions, as they usually arise in cases involving munici-
pal tort liability, would apply here. In some cases this appears to
be true, but the Nebraska judiciary does not consistently follow
that distinction in enough cases to support establishment of a rule.
1. Eminent Domain
It is understood that the power of eminent domain like the power
to tax represents one of the hallowed hallmarks of a state's sover-
eign status.53 It is further understood that in the exercise of this
power by municipalities, uniformity of procedure is probably bene-
ficial-especially to the private interests from which the property
is taken for a public use. On these bases, the solution prescribed
in the following decision may then be considered as a reasonable
one in the conflict between state and municipal authorities.
Grand Island authorized establishment of a park. In pursuance
of the home rule charter an ordinance was passed permitting the
city to acquire land. This action was challenged in a suit wherein
the plaintiffs contended that park land should be acquired under
the eminent domain statute applying to first-class cities. Support-
ing the petitioner's contentions, the court ruled that eminent domain
proceedings were matters of ".... state-wide concern applicable in
all cities within the class therein designated, which includes the
city of Grand Island, whether they be home rule cities or not and
the provisions of the home rule charter . . . must yield thereto."54
2. Power to Tax and Assess
Taxing for municipal purposes under a home rule charter is
one area in which it is clear that the home rule charter overrides
"general" state statutes. When Lincoln adopted its home rule
charter in 1917, it absorbed the then existing limitation of municipal
taxation which placed a general dollar limit on property tax rev-
enues which could be levied in any year. By 1930, the city's revenue
needs were growing beyond the limit and an amendment to the city
charter raising the limit was adopted. In 1937, a suit challenging
52 Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922).
53 See May v. City of Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W.2d 448 (1945).
54 Nagle v. City of Grand Island, 144 Neb. 67, 69, 12 N.W.2d 540, 541 (1943).
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city authority to tax beyond the previous concurrent statutory-
home rule dollar ceiling was initiated.5 It was held that the
amended home rule provision relating to the outer limits of taxing
authority "superseded" the previous legislative charter and thus
there was no violation of due process in exacting taxes above the
statutory limit, which had remained at the 1917 level.50 After dis-
cussing the problem of distinguishing between areas of municipal
and state authority, the court stated:
As we have intimated before, city taxes, to be used strictly for
city purposes, are a matter of municipal concern and in no way
concern the state in their subject matter nor in the way they were
assessed and levied in the case at bar.5 7
3. Regulation of Surface Transportation Systems
Regulation of various public utilities by city councils sitting
as public utilities commissions is not uncommon in the United States;
nor are Nebraska cities deprived of this power. There arise, how-
ever, situations which call for a specific ruling as to what aspect
of utility regulation should be a municipal responsibility on the
one hand or a state responsibility on the other. Though this is an
area of more than passing interest, only one Nebraska Supreme
Court decision was found involving utility regulation and touching
at the same time upon a conflict of authority between a home rule
city and the state.
Having alleged its inability to meet expenses on certain bus
routes within the city, the Omaha and Council Bluffs Street Rail-
way Company applied to the Nebraska State Railway Commission
for permission to curtail services. In response the commission
granted the application and the city of Omaha appealed.58 In its
brief Omaha averred that the State Railway Commission ".... erred
55 Eppley Hotels Co. v. City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 276 N.W. 196 (1937).
513 The same limit-365,000, plus amounts sufficient to pay bonded in-
debtedness accruing during the year and any judgment against the city-
still exists. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 15-804 (Reissue 1954). The court noted in the
Eppley Hotels Co. case that the legislative charter tax restriction applies to
other cities of the primary class which have not adopted home rule. "It
and its amendments from time to time have continued to be and still are
the charter of cities of the same population whose people have not taken
advantage of the home rule charter of the Constitution." Eppley Hotels Co.
v. City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 556, 276 N.W. 196, 200 (1937). Since at least
1921, there has been no primary city other than Lincoln.
57 Eppley Hotel Co. v. City of Lincoln, 133 Neb. 550, 557, 276 N.W. 196, 200
(1937).
58 Omaha and Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 825,
252 N.W. 407 (1934).
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in assuming jurisdiction and in holding that it had jurisdiction to
pass upon the application of the street car company."' 9 The argu-
ment of the city was that, by virtue of its home rule charter, the
city only had power to authorize the curtailment of the service
involved. The court rejected the city's contention on two grounds.
First, it noted that the constitutional home rule provisions stated
that home rule charters were subject to the constitution and laws
of the state. From this starting point, the court ruled that because
the legislature had empowered the State Railway Commission to
authorize street railways to employ motor buses, and subject the
use of such buses to the same regulation of rates, fares and service as
street railways, 60 that state law specifically had given jurisdiction
to the Railway Commission. This, the court held, prevailed over the
city's claim to jurisdiction through its home rule charter. The
second ground stated that the court's support of Railway Commis-
sion jurisdiction was based on the distinction between matters of
municipal and state concern.
Mass transportation of passengers by common carriers within
the state is, and ought to be considered, under our existing Con-
stitution and laws, a matter of state concern. It would be anomalous
to commit to a regulatory body, created by the Constitution, juris-
diction over intrastate steam railroads carrying passengers for hire
everywhere within the state boundaries and to deny that jurisdic-
tion over a carrier operating within a home rule charter municipal-
ity .... To adopt it would subject the various municipalities of
the state ... to a chaotic lack of uniformity of regulation.61
What is inherently bad about local variations in regulations per-
taining to local transit systems does not appear in the opinion.
4. Regulation of Liquor Traffic and Gambling
To those familiar with the generally prevailing attitude of the
Anglo-American judiciary toward regulation and control of the
liquor and gambling interests, it is admittedly redundant to point
out that in cases arising under such regulatory acts as federal, state
and local governing bodies adopt towards this purpose, the courts
generally set themselves to the task of "harmonizing" conflicts or
utilizing enactments in such manner as to provide for the maximum
impact upon the object of regulation. This too apparently is true
of Nebraska's judicial approach. Two cases concerning regulations
of liquor sales and gambling point in this direction.
59 Id. at 829, 252 N.W. at 408.
60 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 74-1103 (Reissue 1950).
61 Omaha and Council Bluffs St. Ry. Co. v. City of Omaha, 125 Neb. 825,
831, 252 N.W. 407, 409 (1934).
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In Bodkin v. State,6 2 a conviction for selling liquor to a minor
was had under a city ordinance in which knowledge on the part
of the seller that the purchaser was a minor was not an element.
The then existing state statute63 covering the situation made it a
misdemeanor to sell liquor to minors "knowing them to be such."
The court said, "The duty of the court to harmonize state and
municipal legislation if permissible in view of all enactments on
the same subject has always been recognized. ' 64 No heed was given
to the argument that the city ordinance was void for contradicting
a state statute, the inconsistency being considered as a "mere lack
of uniformity in detail." Thus the city and state regulations were
construed together to gain the greatest impact. The court noted
reasons why the city might reasonably require more stringent
standards on the part of liquor dealers than the state:
... In Lincoln, a populous educational center, where throngs
of students attend school, many of them minors away from parental
care in a new environment, the city lawmakers were prompted to
adopt a stricter regulation than that provided by statute for the
protection of minors generally from the sale of intoxicating liquors.
On this subject the public policy of the state and the city is the
same. The evils against which the legislation is directed is the same.
[sic] The legislative purposes do not differ.65
In State ex rel. Hunter v. The Araho,66 an Omaha ordinance
licensing bookies was claimed to recognize the business as legiti-
mate in that home rule city. The court had no difficulty in disposing
of this contention for the ordinance itself stated it was solely a
revenue measure not aimed at regulating or controlling the taking
of bets as a business. Furthermore, with a specific constitutional
mandate forbidding gambling, save in certain exceptional situ-
ations, the court had a sound basis upon which to hold the control
of such activity a matter of state-wide interest.
B. MUNICIPAL SERVICES TO CITIZENS
Although it would seem that most services performed by cities
primarily for the citizens thereof would be considered as matters
primarily to be controlled by home rule charters, such is not the
case. As will be found, such services occasionally will be inter-
preted as being of state-wide concern. Reciprocal situations have
62 132 Neb. 535, 272 N. W. 547 (1937).
63 The knowledge element was soon dropped from the statute. Neb. Laws
c. 125, § 1 (1937).
64 132 Neb. at 537, 272 N.W. at 548.
65 Ibid.
66 137 Neb. 389, 289 N.W. 545 (1940).
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also arisen, strangely enough, in, of all functions, the field of public
safety.
1. The Public Safety Function
Authorities in the field of municipal government are generally
agreed that the public safety activities carried on by police and
fire departments are considered as governmental rather than pro-
prietary or municipal functions. Respecting the fire protection func-
tion, this position has not always been accepted by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. In 1939 Omaha proposed a charter amendment to
place her policemen and firemen on the same pension basis. This
action was challenged by interested parties who claimed that the
proposed ordinance was an impairment of their rights arising from
the existing state firemen's pension and relief laws.67 The court
denied that the statute was controlling since it had been passed
before Omaha acquired home rule status. The charter applying
to Omaha in her pre-home rule days, said the court, ".. . lost its
qualities as a statutory charter . . . and in lieu thereof, by virtue
of an explicit constitutional grant, its terms then existing became
a home rule charter. '68 The court invoked the doctrine that the
"silence of the state" permitted the home rule charter provisions
to govern in the matter of firemen's pensions. The next year, how-
ever, an opposite result was reached in a case dealing with fire-
men's pensions in the home rule city of Lincoln.69 In the second
case, dealing not with the form but with the existence of a pension
fund, the court determined that specific statutes concerning fire-
men's pensions in cities of the primary class were binding on the
city. "We have come to the conclusion, after an examination of the
authorities, that a statute providing for firemen's pensions is a mat-
ter of state-wide concern applicable to all cities within the desig-
nated class, whether they be home rule cities or not. °7 0 It is note-
worthy that Lincoln was then, as now, the only city in the primary
class. Still another dispute involving pension rights developed and
was finally brought for adjudication before the state supreme
court. This time the suit was pressed by members of the Omaha
police force seeking a declaratory judgment ". . . declaring their
rights, duties and liabilities under the pension provisions of the
Omaha city charter . . . [and] . . . a declaration that a charter
67 Munch v. Tusa, 140 Neb. 457, 300 N.W. 385 (1941).
68 Id. at 468, 300 N.W. at 391.
69 Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
70 Id. at 58, 2 N.W.2d at 615.
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amendment was unconstitutional and void . . .,,z' The plaintiff's
argument again rested on the contention that pensions of policemen
(as firemen) were subject to state rather than municipal acts. But
Chief Justice Simmons and the majority of the court found for. the
city, holding that pension fund provisions might be amended and
were determined by such charter provisions, as amended.72 Both
the Munch and the Lickert cases were bolstered by a 1945 opinion
in which it was held that "The pension rights of firemen in the city
of Omaha are declared to be presently determined from the home
rule charter of the city and amendments thereto."73 The Axberg
case to the contrary notwithstanding, it is thus reasonable to assume
that matters involving pensions of firemen and policemen in home
rule cities may be considered of state-wide concern in substantive
matters and of rrunicipal concern in matters of form. Generally
the same doctrine is found in State ex rel. Fischer v. City of Lin-
coln74 where the dismissal of a fireman was upheld as against an
allegedly controlling statute. According to the court the matter
of dismissal was ". . . purely of local concern . . . [affecting] . .
only indirectly or remotely ... the people of the state outside the
particular municipality. .... -75
2. The Educational Function
By legislative act 6 the establishment and maintenance of a
university was authorized for Omaha. Subsequently, the validity
of this statute was attacked on the grounds that Omaha as a home
rule city was exempt from such legislative interference into her
allegedly local affairs. The courts, however, held that ". . . the
schools in which are educated the children who are to become in
time the directors of our political destinies are matters of state and
not of strictly municipal concern. To have educated and intelligent
men and women cannot be of strictly local concern. It concerns the
whole state. '77 Bringing the reasoning in the decision to its logical
conclusion, the court denied that a home rule city was exempted
from the application of a public act touching upon matters of
education.
71 Lickert v. City of Omaha, 144 Neb. 75, 76, 12 N.W.2d 644, 645 (1944).
1 2 Ibid.
73 Sullivan v. City of Omaha, 146 Neb. 297, 19 N.W.2d 510 (1945).
[headnote 8].
74 State ex rel. Fischer v. City of Lincoln, 137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 499 (1939).
75 Id. at 102, 288 N.W. at 502.
76 Neb. Laws c. 200, p. 689 (1927).
77 Carlberg v. Metcalfe, 120 Neb. 481, 488,234 N.W. 87, 91 (1930).
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3. Health and Sanitation
A judicial horrible conjured up in the Axberg case apparently
points toward a policy of state dominance in the field of health and
sanitation. The evil foreseen in that case was a situation in which
the state would be helpless to step in during emergency conditions
where local authorities neglected or refused to act, if such matters
as police, fire and health protection were allowed to be viewed
as being of strictly municipal concern. The policy set forth in the
Axberg decision was carried forward in Michelson v. City of Grand
Island78 where the power of the city to cut off a resident's water
supply for non-payment of sewage charges was challenged. The
question of the city's authority to compel payment in such a manner
was upheld by the court-not upon the basis of power granted
through the home rule charter, but upon statutory provisions
enacted subsequent to the adoption of the charter. Though the
statute offered two methods of enforcing payment, it did not in-
clude a discontinuance of water service. 79 However, the court held
that the ".. . regulations adopted by the city ordinance ... is [sic]
not an unreasonable regulation and is permitted under . . ." the
statute. 80
4. Streets and Parking Lots
Until recently in Nebraska the municipal street function had
been considered a matter of strictly local concern. For example,
in 1929 it was held that:
.... The matter of improving the streets, alleys and highways
within the oorporate limits of a municipality is one strictly of
municipal concern and the municipal authorities in regard to such
improvements are only required to act in conformity with the pro-
visions of the charter under which such city has its legal existence,
and under the charter of the city of Lincoln its municipal officers
are authorized to pave and improve connecting as well as intersect-
ing streets.8 '
In a conflict between Grand Island's charter and a general
statute, the court resolved the dispute in like manner:
The appellant appears to contend that the right to pave the
streets of a home rule city ... is derived from the general statutes of
the state. Such is not the fact. As to matters purely local in character
the Legislature is powerless to act. In the present case, the city of
Grand Island did adopt the general statutory provisions then in ex-
78 154 Neb. 654, 48 N.W.2d 769 (1951).
79 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 18-503 (Reissue 1954).
80 154 Neb. at 669, 48 N.W.2d at 777.
81 Salsbury v. City of Lincoln, 117 Neb. 465, 468, 220 N.W. 827, 828 (1929).
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istence when it adopted its charter. This is merely a coincidence
and does not change the fact that the origin of its powers was the
Constitution and not the statute applicable to other than home rule
cities.S2 (Emphasis added.)
The most recent decision in this field, however, marks a sharp
reversal from the position expounded in the preceding statements.
In 1956, when a challenge was made to the home rule city of
Omaha's power to construct municipal off-street parking under
authority of state statute, the Nebraska Supreme Court viewed
the controls over city streets and parking facilities as one which
the state legislature could delegate to cities as it sees fit.
The state has inherent power to establish, maintain, and control
the highways of the state, including those within corporate limits
of municipalities. While the Legislature may properly delegate cer-
tain powers over streets, alleys, and highways to a municipality,
it retains power to legislate with reference thereto, even in home
rule cities, where a matter of state-wide policy and concern are
involved.
City streets are necessarily a part of the highway system of
the state. The concentration of traffic in metropolitan cities through
which traffic in and out of the city must move is a matter of general
rather than strictly local concern.8 3
Thus it appears that municipal streets and parking facilities are
matters of strictly municipal concern only so long as the legislature
wills them to be so.
III. CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of the cases examined, one finds it impossible to
believe that except with regard to functions of comparatively minor
importance such as the assessment procedures of the local taxing
process, the assessment of real estate for extension of water mains,
and relatively unimportant procedural matters involving firemen's
and policemen's pensions, municipal home rule charters in Nebraska
are of value in fostering and maintaining local autonomy.
In 1939 Mr. Justice Johnsen in State ex rel. Fischer v. City of Lin-
coin 84 asserted that liberal judicial construction encouraged munic-
ipalities in assuming the powers and responsibilities of self-govern-
ment. "Recurrently.. ," he continued, ..... we discover that democ-
82 State ex rel. Martin v. Cuningham, 158 Neb. 708, 712, 64 N.W.2d 465,
467 (1954).
83 Omaha Parking Authority v. City of Omaha, 163 Neb. 97, 105, 77 N.W.2d
862, 869 (1956).
84 137 Neb. 97, 288 N.W. 499.
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racy is only the hearth-shadow of local self-government and try
to preserve the crackle of its flame."8 5 One dislikes initiation of a
disagreement with such a distinguished jurist, but it is felt that
now, for all practical intents and purposes, the law of municipal
home rule in Nebraska is embalmed in Dillon's Rule instead of
being enshrined in the state's constitution.
85 Id. at 101, 288 N.W. at 501.
